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INTRODUCTION
Tender offers are a recognized facet of corporate existence, although
the number of those offers is quite small. Those seeking to acquire a
company by tender offer face a complex task. The offeror must typically
provide information to, or seek approval of, federal entities, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Justice Department.
State regulatory requirements may also be involved. Such offers may be
"friendly" or "hostile"; that is, accepted or rejected by the board of the
target corporation. When the offer is hostile, the target or its shareholders
usually mount administrative or judicial challenges. The process will be
complicated when the target corporation holds licenses issued by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or The Commission), which must
approve in advance the transfer of control of one of its licensees. The
Commission adopted specific procedures in 1985 regarding hostile tender
offers for its licensees in order to carry out its statutory obligations in
harmony with other important federal policies. The procedures provided
much-needed clarification, but a few issues remain unresolved. These
include the Commission's statutory authority to use the procedures adopted.
The Commission may soon be required to address these matters as a result
of the recent increase in corporate mergers and acquisitions. This Article
will describe the Commission's current policies regarding hostile tender
offers and discuss the issues arising from them.'

I. BACKGROUND
In a tender offer, the offeror asks the shareholders of the target
corporation to sell, or "tender," their shares to the offeror at a stated price.2

1. An entity may also acquire control of a licensee by electing its own slate of
directors to the target's board by means of a proxy contest. The Commission's procedures
for processing proxy contests have passed judicial review, In Re Committee for Full Value
of Storer Comm., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 434, 57 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1651, aff'd per curiam, Storer Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 763 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir.
1985), and that subject is outside the scope of this Article.
2. The offeror often seeks all of the target's outstanding shares but may seek any
amount down to a majority of the issued shares. While it is also possible to make a tender

Number 1]

HOSTIE TENDER OFFERS FOR FCC LICENSEES

169

To induce shareholders to tender their shares, the offered price is usually
well above the market price before announcement of the offer. SEC
regulations give the directors of the target corporation up to ten days to
accept, reject, or take no position on the offer,3 consistent with their
fiduciary duties. An agent for the offeror, called a depositary, collects the
shares tendered. If less than the specified number of shares are received, the
depositary will return them to shareholders. In contrast, if sufficient shares
to gain control are tendered, the depositary will pay the tendering shareholders and transfer the stock to the offeror.4 The offer must be held open
for at least twenty days,' although the offeror may specify longer periods
and may extend the period initially set. Shareholders have the right to withdraw tendered shares at any time the offer is open.6
Section 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934' (the Act or the
Communications Act) comes into play if the target company holds
Commission licenses. That section provides that the Commission must find
that a grant of a transfer of control of a licensee is consistent with the
public interest, as defined by Commission rules and policies. Further, the
sale of more than 50 percent of a corporation's stock is a "substantial
change in ownership or control" within the meaning of the Act,' which sets
in motion several procedural requirements. Specifically, the Act requires
public notice 9 that the transfer application has been accepted and imposes

offer for less than a controlling interest in a licensee, the Commission's procedures, which
are triggered only by a substantial change in ownership or control, would not generally be
applicable in that case.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1996).
4. 'The rights of the shareholders who do not tender their shares are defined by the
terms of the tender offer and by state laws.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1996).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1996). In 1985, when the Commission adopted its current
procedures for processing hostile tender offers, SEC regulations permitted tendering shareholders to withdraw their shares during the first 15 days of the offer and any time after 60
days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(d)-7(a)(1) (1985). The SEC later changed that rule to permit
withdrawal rights at any time during the offer. Amendments of Tender Offer Rules; AllHolders and Best Price, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,873, 25,880-81 (1986).
7. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1994). That statute provides in part:
No... station license, or any rights thereunder, shall be transferred, assigned, or
disposed of in any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly, or
by transfer of control of any corporation holding such ... license, to any person
except upon application to the Commission and upon finding by the Commission
that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby.
Id.
8. 47 U.S.C. § 309(c)(2)(B) (1994).
9. Applications are first reviewed by the Commission's staff for basic requirements
such as payment of fees, completeness, and proper signatures. If an application passes this
initial screening, the required public notice is prepared and issued. In the past, the

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49

a thirty-day waiting period, during which interested parties may file
petitions to deny the application. 0 If such a petition is filed, the applicant
and petitioner are given time to file opposition and reply pleadings."
Depending on the method of service of pleadings, completion of the
pleading cycle might take fifty-one days, and even a few days longer if
holidays fall within the pleading cycle. 2 The Commission is required to
hold a hearing if a petition raises a "substantial and material question of
fact" as to why the grant of an authorization would not be consistent with
the public interest.13 Any required hearings would take many months, but
such hearings are rare. 4 If a petition raises no substantial and material
questions of fact, and the public interest would otherwise be served, the
Commission will grant the application, accompanied by a decision explaining its action. 5 The time needed for the preparation of a decision depends
on factors such as the availability of Commission resources and the number
and complexity of issues raised in the pleadings.

Commission's staff has expedited the public notice process in cases involving hostile tender
offers, and the required notices were issued three to five work days after filing the applications.
10. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1994). Procedures for participation in Commission application
proceedings are summarized in Sales of FCCAuthorizations, supra note *,at 290-94.

11. Applicants have ten days to oppose a petition, and petitioners are then afforded five

days to respond. 47 C.F.R. § 1.45(a)-(b) (1995).
12. If the petition and oppositions are served by mail, an additional three days is
granted to the opposing party to file responsive pleadings. 47 C.F.R. § 1.4(h) (1995).
Further, holidays are not counted in determining filing periods of seven days or less, and any
pleadings due to be filed on a weekend or holiday should be filed on the next business day.
47 C.F.R. § 1.4(g)-(j) (1995).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)-(e) (1994).
14. Hearings are rare on transfer and assignment applications for a variety of reasons.
Congress purposely established high pleading standards under the Act in order to avoid
unnecessary, time-consuming hearings. For example, factual allegations, except where
official notice may be taken, must be supported by an affidavit from a person with first-hand
knowledge of the facts alleged: allegations supported by "information and belief' are not
permitted. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1994); S. REP.No. 86-690, at 3 (1959) ("[The] allegation of
ultimate, conclusionary facts or mere general allegations on information and belief, supported
by general affidavits,. . . are not sufficient."). Further, the existence of the petition-to-deny
process results in self-screening by buyers, which eliminates potential applicants that would
have difficulty meeting Commission requirements. Finally, buyers tie up substantial capital
to make purchases. They seek a licensed operation, not a protracted hearing with possible
judicial review, during which that capital might not be available for other purposes. As a
result, a typical buyer would withdraw its application rather than face a lengthy hearing.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(2) (1994).
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OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSE TO HOSTILE

TENDER OFFERS
The first published 16 Commission case dealing with a hostile tender
offer was its 1973 decision in Continental Telephone Corp.,17 where it
applied standard procedures, considered the opposing pleadings, and granted
the application. The subject then lay dormant until the 1985 ruling in One

Two Corporation,'8 where the Commission adopted special, expedited
procedures for processing applications to transfer control of licensee
corporations by means of a hostile tender offer. Those procedures were later
refined and incorporated in a 1986 policy statement, Tender Offers and
Proxy Contests (Tender Offers). 9 The Commission adopted this policy
statement after notice and comment and applied it in subsequent adjudicato21
20
ry cases involving hostile tender offers, which are cited below.

16. There is one earlier unpublished decision involving the attempt of Hughes Tool Co.
to acquire control of American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., by tender offer. This case will be
discussed below in Part VI.A.
17. In Re Continental Tel. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order,41 F.C.C.2d 957,
28 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 30 (1973). The target in that case was also the subject of a friendly
tender offer. The companion case granting the applications of the friendly offeror is In Re
Pacific Power & Light Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 42 F.C.C.2d 375, 28 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 106 (1973). These cases illustrate two basic points. The Commission's grant
of a transfer application is permissive only and does not compel the parties to close the
transaction. United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 351 (1959); In Re WWORTV, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,6 FCC Rcd. 193, para. 26, 68 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1282 (1990), reconsiderationdenied in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd.
6569, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1617 (1991). Further, the Commission's grant of a transfer
application does not signal its support or preference for a proposed transferee. Its action is
solely a finding that the transferee meets Commission requirements, if the parties go forward
with the sale. In Re Continental Tel. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order,41 F.C.C.2d
958, para. 5, 28 Pad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 30.
18. In Re One Two Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
924 (1985).
19. In Re Tender Offers & Proxy Contests, Policy Statement, 59 Had. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1536 (1986) [hereinafter Tender Offers Policy Statement], appeal dismissedsub nom. Office
of Comm. of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The
expedited procedures are available to hostile offerors but are not required. In fact, Turner
Broadcasting System followed standard procedures in its unsuccessful 1985 effort to buy
CBS by tender offer. Turner withdrew its application before the Commission issued a
decision, but the existence of the offer was mentioned in a decision responding to Turner's
challenges to certain defensive measures taken by CBS. In Re Turner Brdcst Sys., Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 843, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1507 (1985).
20. The Commission procedures on hostile tender offers are applicable to all corporate
licensees, notjust those licensees also subject to the SEC's jurisdiction. Tender Offers Policy
Statement, 59 Had. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, 1552 n.77; In Re L.P. Media, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 1276, para. 12, 58 Had. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1527 (1985). The
procedures also apply to corporations whose Commission-regulated activities are a small part
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The Commission rested its decision to adopt expedited procedures for
processing hostile tender offers on two concepts. First, the courts have
directed the Commission to consider policies set out in other federal laws
in making its public interest judgments, if it can do so consistent with its
own statute." Second, the Commission determined that expedition of any

required government review was an important policy underlying tender offer
regulation. Tender offers can be beneficial by providing a means to remove
inefficient management. On the other hand, the offeror might be a "raider"
more interested in stripping the target of its assets than in the long-term
viability of the company. Securities laws take the position that the benefits
or detriments of any tender offer should be determined by shareholders
armed with full information as to the offer, but that the government should
be neutral as between the offeror and incumbent management. Unnecessary
of the overall business. See In Re Macfadden Acquisition Corp., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 545, para. 9, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 339 (1986) (Macfadden I)
(applying the special procedures to a corporation whose regulated activities accounted for
16% of its revenues and 41% of its assets).
21. In Re L.P. Media, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 1276, 58
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1527; In Re Macfadden Acquisition Corp., Memorandum Opinionand
Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 545, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 339 (Macfadden I); In Re Macfadden
Acquisition Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 872
(Macfadden II), reconsiderationdenied in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1066 (1986); In Re JB Acquisition Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1095, reconsiderationdenied in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1288 (1986) (JB Acquisition I); In Re JB Acquisition Corp.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order,60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1207 (1986) (JB Acquisition II);
In Re CNCA Acquisition Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 6088, 64
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 947 (1988); In Re QVC Network, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 8485, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 320 (1993); In Re Viacom, Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 8439, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 292 (1993);
In Re Rogers Comm., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7350, 75 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 116 (1994) (D.A. Acting Chief, Cable Services Bureau). These cases all
involved tender offers utilizing the expedited procedures set out in One Two Corporationand
in Tender Offers. The Macfadden and JB Acquisition cases all involved the same target
licensee, John Blair & Co. Similarly, the QVC and Viacom rulings were in response to two
competing tender offers for Paramount Communications, Inc. In sum, the Commission has
issued eight decisions involving six licensees under the procedures first adopted in 1985.
22. See, e.g., Nat'l Brdcst. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223 (1943) (stating that
the Commission "should administer its regulatory powers with respect to broadcasting in the
light of the purposes which the Sherman Act was designed to achieve"); Storer Comm., Inc.
v. FCC, 763 F.2d 436, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (stating that the "Commission has
a duty to implement the Communications Act but also must attempt to do so in a manner
as consistent as possible with corporate and federal security laws' protection of shareholders'
rights"); LaRose v. FCC, 494 F.2d 1145, 1147 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (observing generally that
"[a]dministrative agencies have been required to consider other federal policies, not unique
to their particular area of administrative expertise, when fulfilling their mandate to assure
that their regulatees operate in the public interest," and specifically remanding the case to
the Commission for further consideration of the policies underlying the bankruptcy laws).

Number 1]

HOSTILE TENDER OFFERSFOR FCC LICENSEES

173

delay is not considered neutral because incumbent management would be
afforded time to erect barriers to the offer. The Commission noted the fiftyone-day period required to complete the normal pleading cycle, and
believed that it could not reasonably review those pleadings and draft,
consider, vote on, and release a decision within the sixty-day period after
which tendered shares could be withdrawn under SEC regulations then in
effect.' The Commission concluded that resort to its normal procedures
would lead to unnecessary delay, and that such delay would favor
incumbent management, contrary to the policies underlying relevant
securities regulation.24
As a result of those conclusions, the Commission adopted a two-step
procedure. In the first step, the Commission asks offerors to submit a
request for a temporary authorization, issued under section 309(f) of the
Act, for an independent trustee to take control of the licensee. That section
enables the Commission to grant temporary authorizations in "extraordinary
circumstances" when required by the public interest.2 Section 309(f) has
26
no provisions for a thirty-day waiting period or formal petitions to deny,
which permits faster action than is possible using normal procedures. The
request for temporary authorization must contain such information to
establish the qualifications of the trustee and a copy of the trust agreement,
including provisions designed to assure the independence of the trustee. If
its requirements are met, the Commission will grant a temporary authorization, which permits the trustee to collect the stock and to operate the

23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(d)-7(a)(1) (1985). See supra note 6.
24. See generally Tender Offers Policy Statement, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, paras.
23-33 (setting out in detail the Commission's rationale and supporting citations). Filing the
transfer application wcll before filing the tender offer with the SEC does not resolve the
problem of delay due to FCC procedures. Filing the transfer application would give notice
to incumbent management of the licensee and so afford them time to initiate barriers to the
offer. Further, the SEC would apparently consider the filing of the transfer application with
the FCC to constitute the beginning of the tender offer. Id. at 1559 n.108.
25. 47 U.S.C. § 309(0 (1994). The full text of this section is set out below in note 36.
26. That does not mean that the target corporation is without a means to object to such
subjects as the qualifications and insulation of the trustee, and compliance of the trust with
the requirements of Tender Offers Policy Statement, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, paras.
23-33. The Commission's Rules permit informal objections, 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.30(c), 73.3587,
78.22(c) (1995), and those objections have been fully considered in all cases using the
expedited, two-step procedures. The staff usually calls for a meeting with counsel for the
offeror and the target to set an expedited pleading schedule. That schedule typically permits
the target to file an opposition pleading a day or two after the date on which the target corporation has rejected the offer. As noted above in note 3 and accompanying text, the SEC
grants the target up to 10 days to accept, reject, or take no position on the offer. The staff
practice avoids requiring the target to take a position on the offer before the SEC requires
it to do so.
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company. At this point, the tender offer has been promptly completed. The
trustee is intended to be temporary licensee and limits are placed on his or
her actions; for example, the trustee is directed to maintain the status quo
of the licensee's operations, as much as is possible, and is strictly insulated
from the offeror. Thus, while the offeror may communicate in writing with
the trustee with regard to the tender of shares and the payment for them, it
cannot communicate in writing or otherwise, directly or indirectly, with
regard to the operation or management of the licensed operations.2 7
At the same time the offeror files its request for a temporary
authorization, it must also file an application to transfer control of the
licensee from the trustee to the offeror. That application is often referred to
as a "long-form" application.s The second step of the process is consideration of that application and any associated pleadings. If the tender
offer is successful and the trustee controls the licensee, the long-form
application can be processed under normal procedures, including the thirtyday waiting period and potential petitions from interested parties. If the
offeror is then found qualified, the application will be granted. In contrast,
if the offeror is ultimately found unqualified, the trustee is obligated to find
a buyer that9 can pass Commission muster, following normal application
2
procedures.
III. THE USE OF SECTION 309(F) iN HOSTILE TENDER OFFERS
Most target corporations and several public interest groups have
challenged the use of section 309(f) in the context of hostile tender
offers.3" Although the Commission issued temporary authorizations in the

27. Tender Offers Policy Statement, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, paras. 63-65. The
insulation criteria set out there were based on existing insulation standards used in other
regulatory contexts. In Re Corporate Ownership Reporting and Disclosure by Brdcst
Licensees, Report and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 997, para. 54, 55 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1465
(1984), reconsideredin part in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
604 (1985),further reconsideredin Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 FCC Rcd. 802, 61
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 739 (1986).
28. The issuance of a temporary authorization is available only when "an application
subject to subsection [309](b) has been filed." 47 U.S.C. § 309(f) (1994). The long-form
transfer application is subject to section 309(b), and the filing of such a transfer application
is, therefore, a statutory prerequisite to issuance of the temporary authorization.
29. After shareholders of the target receive payment for their tendered shares, they are
free to use the proceeds as they wish. The trustee cannot compel them to repurchase their
shares in the target, so the former ownership of the licensee cannot be reconstituted, if the
offeror is found unqualified by the Commission.
30. The various entities opposing the Commission's procedures will be referred to
collectively as "critics." Most of the critics raised the same or similar arguments in their
pleadings. Accordingly, no effort has been made here to identify specific arguments with
specific parties.
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cases cited above, no judicial review followed because the hostile tender
offers were unsuccessful or withdrawn.31 In one case, a majority of the
shares were not tendered and in other cases a company considered
"friendly" by the target subsequently made a higher bid. Several parties did
appeal the policy statement in Tender Offers, but the court ruled that the
matter was not ripe for review.32 Accordingly, the propriety of the
Commission's use of section 309(f) has not yet passed judicial review. Then
Chief Judge Wald, however, dissented when Tender Offers was before the
court. She believed that the matter was ripe for review and stated briefly
that if she were to reach the merits of the case, she would hold that section
309(f) could not be used to issue temporary authorizations to a trustee in
the context of hostile tender offers.33
A.

The Statute

The language of the statute is the starting point. "If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. ' 34 The Court assumes "that the ordinary meaning of [the
35
statutory] language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."

31. In In Re Rogers Comm., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7350,
75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 116 (1994) (D.A. Acting Chief, Cable Services Bureau), the
transaction began as hostile, but became friendly after negotiations and a modified offer.
32. Office of Comm. of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
33. Because the court dismissed the appeal on the ripeness issue, Judge Wald did not
find it necessary to provide an extensive analysis of the issue. Her full statement was:
Were the panel to reach the merits, I would hold that the FCC's new policy with
respect to tender offers goes beyond its statutory power under § 309(f), the only
statutory provision on which it relies as authority for the trustee mechanism. Based
on my reading of the language and legislative history of this section, I believe
Congress intended § 309(f) to be used only when the FCC needed to put or keep
broadcast stations in operation temporarily so that they might inform citizens of
impending disasters or "extraordinary" political events. I cannot conclude that
Congress intended to allow the FCC to invoke its "safety-valve" authority of
§ 309(f) merely because it found the regular statutory "long-form" procedures were
too cumbersome for broadcast license transfers resulting from a tender offer. Even
if the FCC's new tender offer procedures might be extremely wise as a matter of
policy, this court is bound by the plain language and clear intent of Congress.
Id. at 113-14 n.6.
34. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
35. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985).
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The text of section 309(f) of the Act is set out below.36 Those
challenging the use of section 309(f) in the context of hostile tender offers
focus on the use of the words "extraordinary" and "operation." 37 They
assert that tender offers are not extraordinary. Nevertheless, "extraordinary"
has numerous, sometimes inconsistent, meanings, from the broad to the
narrow.31 Critics would also restrict the word "operation" to mean transmitting a signal, while the Commission uses the word to denote operation
under the control of a new party, the trustee. Here again, the dictionary
definition provides numerous, sometimes conflicting meanings.3 9 With
regard to both words, each side of the controversy could cite at least one
definition to support its position. Nor does the context in which the words
are used provide clarification as to their meaning. Accordingly, resort to the
language of the statute does not resolve the issue of congressional intent.

36. Section 309(f), 47 U.S.C. § 309(f) (1994) states:
When an application subject to subsection (b) of this section has been filed, the
Commission, notwithstanding the requirements of such subsection, may, if the
grant of such application is otherwise authorized by law and if it finds that there
are extraordinary circumstances requiring temporary operations in the public
interest and that delay in the institution of such temporary authorization would
seriously prejudice the public interest, grant a temporary authorization, accompanied by a statement of the reasons therefor, to permit such temporary operations
for a period not exceeding 180 days, and upon making like findings may extend
such temporary operations for additional periods not to exceed 180 days. When
any such grant of a temporary authorization is made, the Commission shall give
expeditious treatment to any timely filed petition to deny such application and to
any petition for rehearing of such grant filed under section 405.
The long-form application filed as the second step of the tender offer procedures is subject
to "subsection (b)" of the Act.
37. Some critics contend that the underlying long-form application is not "otherwise
authorized by law" within the meaning of section 309(f). They provide no explanation,
however, as to why a long-form application filed in the context of a friendly tender offer is
"authorized by law," but that the same application filed in a hostile context is not. Both a
friendly and a hostile offeror intend to acquire control of the target licensee when they file
their applications. The fact that the Commission, not the hostile offeror, imposes a temporary
agent for the offeror (the trustee) should not convert a long-form application from "authorized" to "unauthorized."
38. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIoNARY 807 (1981) provides more
than 20 definitions for the word. Not all those definitions are applicable to the issue
presented here, but a pertinent, broad definition is 'more than ordinary." Narrower
definitions include "of, relating to or having the nature of an occurrence ... or risk of a
kind other than what ordinary experience or prudence would foresee."
39. The dictionary provides more than 20 definitions of "operation" and "operations."
Relevant definitions include "an exercise of power or influence," "the whole process of
planning for and operating a business .. .," "capacity for action or functioning," and "the
operating of or putting or maintaining in action of something (as a machine or an industry.)"
Id. at 1581. The first two definitions are fully consistent with the Commission's use of the
word, the third is consistent with the critics' position, while the last arguably supports both
interpretations.
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Legislative History

It is therefore appropriate to review the legislative history of the
statute for guidance. The Act, as initially promulgated, had no provisions
for the filing of petitions objecting to Commission actions.' In 1952,
Congress adopted a procedure in which parties in interest could file a
protest within thirty days after the Commission granted a particular
application.4 The postgrant procedure proved problematic, and Congress
amended the Act again in 1960 to impose higher pleading standards and to
require the filing of petitions to deny before Commission action on
applications.42 At that time, Congress added section 309(f) of the Act to
serve as a "safety valve to protect the public interest in those rare cases in
which the Commission finds that the delay required [by the normal thirtyday petition-to-deny process] would seriously prejudice the public
interest."'43 As then enacted, section 309(f) would apply only to "emergency operations," which could be authorized for ninety days and which could
be renewed for one additional ninety-day period. The Commission
subsequently adopted rules to govern requests for temporary authorizations
for emergency operations."
Two Commission proceedings provide relevant background to
subsequent legislation. In March, 1968, the Commission granted without
opinion an application to assign the license of station WFMT from Gale
Broadcasting Co. (Gale) to WGN Continental FM Co. (Continental), which
then began operation of the station.45 Several parties appealed the

40. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, reprintedin A LEGISLATiFE
1934 921 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
41. Communications Act Amendments, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-554, 66 Stat. 711, 715
(1952) (amended 1960).
42. Communications Act Amendments, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-752, 74 Stat. 889 (1960).
43. S. REP. No. 86-690, at 4 (1959). The House Report contains a similar, brief
statement. H.R. REP. No. 86-1800, at 13 (1960), reprintedin 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3516, 3521.
The pertinent section of the statute was then identified as section 309(d), but was later
redesignated as section 309(f). For clarity, this Article will use section 309(f) throughout.
44. Current rules are set out at 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.25 (common carrier), 73.1635 (broadcast), and 78.33 (cable television relay service stations) (1995). Prior to 1982, with the
exception of the cases described in the following paragraph, those rules were used to permit
a station to operate in a manner that differed from its license due to emergencies such as
failed equipment or a fallen tower.
45. Under Commission procedures, the parties to an assignment application may close
the sale when the Commission's action is effective. The effective date is set by rules,
47 C.F.R. §§ 1.4(b), 1.102, 1.103 (1995), but is typically the date on which the Commission
issues a notice announcing the grant of the application or releases the text of a decision ruling against any petitions that might have been filed. The "effective date," therefore, is not
equivalent to "finality"; that is, when further administrative or judicial review is no longer
HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
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Commission's action, and the court subsequently remanded the case for
further proceedings.4 6 The Commission determined that a hearing would
be required, but in the intervening months the sole stockholder of Gale had
become incompetent due to illness and could not resume control of the
licensee during the hearing. The Commission, obviously preferring to keep
the station on the air, had two procedural paths open at that point. It could
have required return of the license to Gale and contemporaneously granted
an application transferring control of the licensee to a conservator or trustee,
who would act on behalf of the incompetent controlling stockholder. Such
assignments of license are routinely handled under a specific provision of
the Act that permits expeditious handling of involuntary assignments.47
That trustee or conservator would then operate the station until the
resolution of the hearing. If, however, Continental could establish its
qualifications in the hearing, yet a third assignment would have been
required to transfer the license back to Continental. Rather than go through
such a potentially multistage procedure, the Commission elected to follow
a second path in its decision on remand. It authorized the buyer, Continental, to remain in control of the station during the hearing.48
On remand, the Commission did not initially address the statutory
basis for its decision to keep Continental operating the station, but alluded
to sections 4(i)49 and 309(f) of the Act.5" On reconsideration, the petitioners challenged the Commission's statutory authority for permitting
Continental to operate the station during the hearing. The Commission
responded that while section 309(f) was "not regarded as controlling,"'"

possible. Parties that close the sale when the action is effective, but not final, assume the risk
that the transaction might be set aside after further administrative or judicial review. In Re
Improvement Leasing Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 73 F.C.C.2d 676, para. 19,46
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 175 (1979), aff'd sub nom. Washington Ass'n for Television and
Children v. FCC, 665 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
46. Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
47. 47 U.S.C. § 309(c)(2)(B) (1994). Implementing rules include 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.39(a)
(common carrier stations), 73.3541 (broadcast stations), and 78.35 (cable television relay
service stations) (1995).
48. In Re Gale Brdcst Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 337, para. 13 [hereinafter Gale Brdcst. Co. Memorandum Opinion and Order],
reconsiderationdenied in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.2d 623, 17 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 337 (1969) [hereinafter Gale Brdcst. Co. Reconsideration].
49. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1994). This statute broadly authorizes the Commission to
"perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not
inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions." Id.
50. Gale Brdcst. Co. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 337,
342 n.8.
51. Gale Brdcst. Co. Reconsideration, 19 F.C.C.2d 623, para. 6, 17 Rad. Reg. 2d (P

& F) 337.
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it believed that sections 4(i) and 40)52 of the Act granted it authority "to
permit action which fully and uniquely serves the public interest." 3 No
party appealed the decisions on remand, so the Commission's assertion was
never judicially reviewed.'
The second proceeding was Telesis Corp.,55 where the Commission
granted temporary authority for control of the licensee of stations in the
cable television relay service56 to be transferred to a new entity. It found
authority to permit such operations by a transferee under section 309(c)(2)
(G) of the Act.5 Unlike section 309(f), which is applicable to licensees in
all the services authorized to use the radio spectrum, section 309(c) (2)(G)
is limited to nonbroadcast stations, such as cable television relay service
stations. In addition, temporary operations can be authorized under section
309(c)(2)(G) for no more than sixty days, without extensions. At the time
the Commission issued its decision in Telesis Corp., as noted above, section
309(f) permitted temporary authorizations for up to ninety days, with one
ninety-day extension permitted.
The Commission subsequently sought several amendments to the Act,
some of which it characterized at one point as "technical," including
modifications to section 309(f). Congress accepted the Commission's
recommendations and amended the statute in 1982.58 Congress's specific
amendments to section 309(f) were to change "emergency operations" to
"temporary operations," to extend the periods for initial and renewed
temporary authorizations from ninety to 180 days, and to permit more than
52. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i)4-) (1994). Section 154(i) is quoted above in note 49. Section
154G) provides in part that the "Commission may conduct its proceedings in such manner
as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends ofjustice." 47 U.S.C.
§ 1546) (1994).
53. Gale Brdcst. Co. Reconsideration, 19 F.C.C. 2d 663, para.9, 17 Rad Reg. 2d (P &
F) 337.
54. In a subsequent case, the Commission followed Gale and permitted the buyer to
remain in control of the station after a remand. In Re Arnold L. Chase, Decision, 5 FCC
Rcd. 1642, para. 30, 67 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 815 (1990). There, the Commission did not
discuss the statutory basis for its action, but no party raised the issue at any time during the
proceeding.
55. In Re Telesis Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d 696, 43 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P&F) 612 (1978) [hereinafter Telesis Corp. Memorandum Opinion and Order].
56. Cable television systems establish a "headend"; that is, a common location for
receiving antennas for local television stations and for satellite-distributed stations and networks. Systems serving relatively small areas typically run cables directly from their
headends to subscribers. Larger systems often establish hubs, and run cable from the hubs
to subscribers. Cable television relay service stations are used to transmit signals by
microwave from headends to hubs.
57. 47 U.S.C. § 309(c)(2)(G) (1994).
58. Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96 Stat. 1087,
1094.
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one renewal of a temporary authorization.
The House version of the law was given the short title of "Communications Technical Amendments Act of 1982."' 9 As adopted, however,
Congress dropped the word "technical" from the title. The House Conference Report explained the change as follows: "While many of the
provisions of the Conference Substitute are merely technical revisions of
existing law, several provisions permit the FCC to have greater flexibility
in... carrying out its duties."6 That report did have a section captioned
"Technical Amendments," but the changes to section 309(f) were not
included under that caption. The very brief sections of the reports
accompanying the legislation that refer to section 309(f) do not address the
specific issues raised here.61
Several conclusions can be drawn from this history. Before 1982, the
Commission had twice authorized proposed transferees to operate stations
in Gale and in Telesis. There is no reason to define the word "operation"
differently in subsections 309(f) and 309(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Relying on
general sections 4(i) and (j), as the Commission did in Gale, is always a
weak basis for authority when dealing with specific procedures, such as
those governing petitions to deny. Seeking a statutory amendment to clarify
its authority to install a temporary person or entity to operate a station could
be described by the Commission as a "technical" amendment. 62 It is
Congress's intent that governs, however, not how the Commission viewed
the proposed amendments. Congress did recognize that its new law provided
the agency with "greater flexibility in ... carrying out its duties" and
expanded the reach of the statute by substituting the word "extraordinary"
for "emergency." The Conference Report did not include the amendment to

59. H.R. REP. No. 97-751, at 1 (1982).
60. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-765, at 17 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261.
61. With reference to section 309(0, H.R. REP. No. 97-751, at 30 (1982) states in its
entirety:
This provision lengthens the duration of Special Temporary Authority (STA) from
90 to 180 days, and allows the Commission to renew an STA for additional terms
of 180 days each. While the Committee recognizes that multiple STA renewals
may be appropriate in extraordinary circumstances, it is emphasized that an
applicant for STA renewal bears a heavy burden of showing, consistent with the
test in Section 309(0, that a renewal should be granted.
The Conference Report expresses the same thoughts, but is even shorter. H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 97-765, at 37 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261, 2281.
62. The Commission contemporaneously represented to Congress that its proposed
package of "technical" statutory amendments "would reduce or alter the Commission's
regulatory requirements and responsibilities in certain areas... [and] clarify ambiguities in
the Communications Act." Tender Offers Policy Statement, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536,
1576 n.176 (1986), appeal dismissedsub nom. Office of Comm. of United Church of Christ
v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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section 309(f) in the subsection captioned "Technical Amendments." There
is nothing in the legislative history to establish that Congress believed that
the Commission erred in authorizing temporary operations in Gale or Telesis, or that Congress intended to overrule those decisions. 3 Thus, there is
support for the Commission's position in the legislative history. On the
other hand, the history does not specifically endorse the Commission's
actions in Gale or Telesis, and is silent as to the use of section 309(f) in
relation to tender offers. It can be argued, therefore, as the Court found in
another case, that the statements in the legislative history "were obviously
not made with this narrow issue in mind and they cannot be said to
demonstrate a Congressional desire ..
C.

The Commission's Statutory Interpretation

In reviewing another statute, the Court made the following statement
regarding statutes that do not clearly establish congressional intent:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation .... Sometimes the legislative
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.6 5
As noted, a reviewing court might not find the language of the statute to be
dispositive or that the legislative history does not definitively establish
Congress's intent. If so, there has been an implicit congressional delegation
to the Commission to fill that gap. The question becomes, therefore,
whether the Commission's interpretation of section 309(f) is reasonable.
The Commission carefully reviewed its authority under section 309(f)
of the Act in Tender Offers.66 It generally referred to the matters described
in the preceding two subsections as to the amended statutory language and
63. Judge Wald's dissenting statement on her interpretation of section 309(f) is set out
above in note 33. For the reasons stated in the text, the legislative history does not support
her conclusion that the "plain language and clear intent of Congress," Office of Comm. of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101, 113-14 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1987), preclude
the use of section 309(f) to authorize a trustee to control a licensee during review of a
hostile offeror's qualifications.
64. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America, 325
U.S. 161, 169 (1945).
65. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984). Accord Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991)
("Judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the statutes it
is authorized to implement reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and
judicial branches.").
66. Tender Offers Policy Statement, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, para. 55.
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its legislative history. It noted that by deleting the word "emergency" and
substituting "extraordinary," Congress could not have intended to limit the
applicability of section 309(f) to circumstances that qualified as emergencies
under the former statute.67 Moreover, section 309 of the Act specifies
procedures for dealing with various kinds of applications. There is no
suggestion in that section generally, or in subsection 309(f) specifically, that
excludes transfer applications from the "safety valve" provided by the latter.
The word "operations," the Commission observed, is not defined in the
Act.6 ' Further, there is nothing in the legislative history of the 1982
amendments to suggest that "operations" should be narrowly limited to
mean transmitting a signal, rather than to permit a person to take over the
operations of the licensee. It cited its two previous decisions in which it had
permitted proposed transferees to "operate" stations before final approval
of their transfer applications. 9
The Commission determined that hostile tender offers were "extraordinary" for several reasons. It considered the conflicting regulatory schemes
under the securities laws and the Communications Act to present extraordinary circumstances because the Commission's normal procedures, and the
delay inherent in them, could be used to thwart tender offers for companies
holding Commission licenses." That in turn would deprive shareholders
of those companies the ability to consider tender offers and serve to shield
incumbent management from challenges. Such a shield, the Commission
believed, would be inconsistent with its obligation to accommodate, to the
extent possible, the policies embodied in the securities laws and a need to
remain strictly neutral in the contest for licensee control.7
Congress provided a standard procedure for transfer of control; that is,
the thirty-day wait/petition-to-deny process. Those procedures are used in
all "ordinary" cases transferring control of a licensee. Section 309(f),
however, provides an exception to permit operations in extraordinary

67. Id.
68. In this regard, the Commission noted that even those who opposed the use of
temporary authorizations in hostile tender offers did not agree as to what the word meant.
Id. at 1572 n.157.
69. Gale Brdcst. Co. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 337,
reconsiderationdenied in Gale Brdcst. Reconsideration, 19 F.C.C.2d 623, 17 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 337 (1969), which relied on section 309(f), and Telesis Corp. Memorandum Opinion
and Order 68 F.C.C.2d 696 43 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 612 (1978), which relied on section
309(c)(2)(G), have been described above in Part III.B.
70. The Commission specifically observed that, prior to the adoption of its special
procedures, the acquisition of a broadcast license was a recognized defensive tactic against
hostile tender offers because of the delay caused by administrative proceedings. Tender
Offers Policy Statement, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, 1561 n.114.
71. Id. paras. 45-48.
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circumstances.!2 The words "extraordinary" and "operations" have numerous conflicting definitions. 3 The Commission defined those words
consistent with its broad public interest obligations under the Act and in
light of the expanded scope and flexibility provided to it by the 1982
statutory amendments. There is no basis for concluding that the Commission's definitions are unreasonable. Accordingly, the conclusion should be
reached that the Commission's use of section 309(f) in a limited class of
transfer applications-hostile tender offers-is reasonable and within
Congress's broad delegation of authority to the Commission to further the
public interest.
IV. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE COMMIsSION's PROCEDURES

UNDER THE STATUTE
This part assumes that there is the necessary statutory authority under
section 309(f) to authorize a new party to take over operations of a
Commission licensee that is subjected to a hostile tender offer. The material
that follows goes to the reasonableness of the Commission's actions under
the public interest standard.

A.

Standardof Review

Parties seeking judicial review of Commission actions face a high
hurdle. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts will review a
Commission decision only to determine whether it is "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'74 In the
context of reviewing another Commission policy statement, the Supreme
Court noted the "substantial judicial deference" accorded to the Commission's public interest determinations.75 Thus, if the Commission's action

72. Section 309(f) is not unique in this regard. The Act contains other similar safety
valves from specific statutory requirements where the Commission finds that the public
interest would be served. 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(b)(2)(B)(i) (financial interests of employees),
211(b) (filing of certain contracts of common carriers), 317(d) (sponsor identification of
broadcast matter), 352(d) (exemption of ships from certain radio communication requirements) (1994). Indeed, as noted, section 309 itself contains another such safety valve in
subsection (c)(2)(G), relating to nonbroadcast radio stations. 47 U.S.C. § 309(c)(2)(G)
(1994).
73. These definitions are set out above in notes 38 and 39.
74. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
75. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981). See also FCC v.
Pottsville Brdcst. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (stating that "subordinate questions of
procedure in ascertaining the public interest, when the Commission's licensing authority is
invoked.., were explicitly and by implication left to the Commission's own devising.. .");
FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965) (federal agencies have broad procedural discretion because they "will be familiar with the industries which they regulate and will be in a

FEDERAL COMTAUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49

is based on a "consideration of the relevant factors" and is not otherwise "a
clear error of judgment," its determinations should be upheld. 6
B.

The Commission s Position
The Commission took a rather narrow action. Most transfer applications, generally including friendly tender offers, will continue to be
processed using normal procedures. In the area of hostile tender offers,
normal procedures, including full participation by interested parties, are
followed as to the qualifications of the offerorlbuyer. The Commission's
expedited procedures affect only the ability of interested parties to challenge
formally the qualifications of the interim trustee and of the transferor; that
is, the target licensee under the control of its existing shareholders. Informal
objections to the qualifications of the trustee and the transferors can still be
considered.
The Commission rested its two-step procedures on several grounds.
The courts have often recognized a Commission obligation to consider other
federal laws in making its own public interest determinations.7 7 In its
initial adjudicatory rulings and subsequently in Tender Offers the Commission gave careful consideration to both the Williams Act, concerning tender
offers, and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, regarding
government review of acquisitions and mergers for compliance with the
antitrust laws.78 In the Williams Act, Congress determined that tender
offers could be beneficial or detrimental, and that shareholders should be
provided information by which to make an informed evaluation. The need
for expedition was based on the conclusion that unnecessary delay caused
by government review "might unduly favor the target firm's incumbent
management, and permit them to frustrate many pro-competitive cash tenders.[79] ... [T]he basic purpose of the Williams Act [is] to maintain a

better position than federal courts or Congress itself to design procedural rules adapted to
the peculiarities of the industry and tasks of the agency involved").
76. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 782 F.2d 263, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
77. Cases supporting this proposition are cited above in note 22. It should be noted that
the Commission adopted procedures to accommodate securities laws and the concerns
expressed by Congress. Contrary to the assertion of some critics, the Commission is not
claiming "authority to execute numerous other laws." McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,
321 U.S. 67, 79 (1944) (emphasis added).
78. Tender Offers Policy Statement, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, paras. 23-25
(1986), appeal dismissed sub nom. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 826 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
79. Given enough time, the defensive measures available to incumbent managers seem
limited only by their ingenuity. Defenses may be adopted to discourage takeovers generally,
such as those described in In Re TurnerBrdcst.Sys., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
101 F.C.C.2d 843, paras. 3-7, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1507 (1985), or may be in response
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neutral policy towards cash tender offers by avoiding lengthy delays that
might discourage their chances for success,"8' and the government should
be neutral as between management and the offeror. In these circumstances,
Commission action to minimize delay resulting from its own processes is
reasonable."
Further, the Commission adopted procedures to protect the public. It
does not, as it did in Gale Broadcasting Co. 2 and Telesis Corp., 3 permit
the proposed buyer to operate the stations while its qualifications are under
review, and instead requires operation by a temporary, independent trustee.
With respect to the trustee, the public is in no better or worse position than
it would be when trustees are installed temporarily under section 309(c)(2)(3) of the Acts' for involuntary transfers due to death, bankruptcy, or other
legal disability. All interested parties have a full opportunity to file formal
petitions against the offeror, and those petitions will be fully considered
under normal procedures and disposed of in the same manner as any other
case. Further, the trustee is strictly insulated from the offeror to avoid the
possibility that the latter might take control of station operations premature-

ly.
The Commission also took steps to assure that the special procedures
adopted would be of limited applicability. It stated that the use of its
to a specific tender offer. The literature on the subject is substantial. THE CURRENT LAW
INDEX has a subject heading entitled "CorporateAntitakeover Measures."
80. H.R. REP. No. 94-1393, at 12 (1976). See also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 635 (1982) (plurality opinion) (stating that "providing the target company with additional time within which to take steps to combat the offer ...

furnish[es] incumbent

management with a powerful tool... perhaps to the detriment of stockholders").
81.

In Tender Offers Policy Statement, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, 1553 n.81

(1986), the Commission cited Water TransportAssociation v. ICC, 715 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984), where the court upheld an agency's use of an
interim trust pending consideration of a sale of a regulated facility. The Civil Aeronautics
Board has also adopted trust procedures to permit the closing of a tender offer. Tender
Offers PolicyStatement, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, 1554 nn.82-84. On the other hand,
the Federal Reserve Board rejected expedited procedures when confronted with a hostile
tender offer for a bank under its jurisdiction and a statute that required a 30-day waiting
period and permitted public comment. The Bank of New York, 74 Fed. Res. Bull., No. 4,
257 (1988). Even assuming that identical statutory language is found in the various statutes,
it appears that agencies would be within their discretion either to expedite consideration of
hostile tender offers for companies within their jurisdiction, or to refuse to do so, given their
expert knowledge of the industries they regulate and given the wide discretion afforded to
agencies by statute and court precedent
82. Gale Brdcst. Co. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 Rad Reg. 2d (P & F) 337,
reconsiderationdenied in Gale Brdcst. Co. Reconsideration, 19 F.C.C.2d 623, 17 Rad Reg.
2d (P & F) 337 (1969).
83. Telesis Corp. Memorandum Opinion and Order,68 F.C.C.2d 696,43 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 612 (1978).
84.

47 U.S.C. § 309(c)(2)(B) (1994).
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expedited procedures would not normally be available in the case of
friendly tender offers. s5 As noted, in a hostile tender offer, incumbent
management might use the time to erect barriers to an otherwise beneficial
tender offer. Those concerns are not present in a friendly tender offer,
because management of the target would not be expected to erect barriers
or otherwise try to frustrate the offer. Although a temporary authorization
might be issued to a trustee in a friendly tender offer in cases found
"extraordinary" on other grounds, such an action cannot rest on the rationale
set out in Tender Offers. 6
The proceeding in MMM Holdings7 illustrates another Commission
effort to limit applicability of its tender offer policies. There, a hostile
offeror requested a temporary authorization for its designated trustee. The
parties later began negotiating, and asked the Commission to withhold
processing of the request for a temporary authorization. The negotiations
were not successful, and the offeror requested that processing resume. By
that time, however, the statutory thirty-day waiting period had elapsed as
to the regular applications and interested parties had filed a full set of
pleadings. The staff amended the applications to reflect a transfer directly
from the shareholders of the licensee to the offeror, issued its decision,
found the offeror qualified, and dismissed the request for a temporary
authorization for a trustee. In statutory terms, the case establishes that there
is no need to rely on the extraordinary procedures permitted under section
309(f), when following normal procedures will yield the same result.
85. In Re J.B. Acquisition Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1095, para. 3, reconsiderationdenied in Memorandum Opinion and Order,60 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1288 (1986) (JB Acquisition I).
86. In fact, the Commission did issue a temporary authorization to a trustee in two
friendly tender offers. In Re J.B. Acquisition Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1207 (1986) (J.B. Acquisition II); In Re Viacom, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 8439, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 292 (1993). In both proceedings, the Commission had issued a temporary authorization to a trustee on behalf of a
hostile offeror. The targets then accepted tender offers from friendly parties. The Commission issued temporary authorizations in those limited circumstances on the ground that if it
followed normal procedures as to a friendly offer, with the associated procedural delay, it
would have decided the contest between the competing parties in favor of the hostile offer.
That would have been contrary to the principle of government neutrality, another important
policy underlying relevant securities laws. These circumstances appear to qualify as
"extraordinary," within the meaning of section 309(f). The staff ruling in In Re Rogers
Comm., Inc., 9 FCC Rcd. 7350, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 116 (1994) (D.A. Acting Chief,
Cable Services Bureau), is described below in Part V.B. The staff described the tender offer
as "conditionally" friendly, but was apparently considered "extraordinary" on other grounds.
87. In Re MMM Holdings, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 6838,
66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1593 (D.A. Acting Chief, Mass Media Bureau and Deputy Chief,
Common Carrier Bureau), review denied in Memorandum Opinion and Order,4 FCC Rcd.
8243, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1706 (1989).
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Challenges to the Commission 's Position

There have been several challenges to the reasonableness of the
Commission's choice of procedures. Some critics contended that the use of
the two-step, tender offer procedures would be used by applicants to avoid
normal procedures. The limitations imposed by the Commission have
avoided that result. A review of the Commission's Annual Reports from
1985, when the Commission first began issuing temporary authorizations to
trustees under section 309(f), until 1994, the last year for which figures are

available, discloses grants of 27,544 assignment or transfer applications
involving broadcast stations.88 That figure includes both long- and shortform applications. Approximately 60 percent, or 16,526, of that total were
long-form applications.8 9 In the same period, as listed above in note 21,
the Commission issued eight temporary authorizations under section 309(f),
involving six licensees. Four of these held broadcast licenses for a total of
forty-two stations. Thus, about 0.25 percent of the broadcast licenses that
changed hands since 1985 have been subjected to hostile tender offers.90

88. The Commission's Annual Reports do not list the number of assignment and transfer
applications granted in the common carrier and cable television services. Review of the
relevant cases discloses that In Re CNCA Acquisition, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 6088, 6095 n.1, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 947 (1988), dealt primarily
with common carrier radio stations, and that the staff ruling in In Re Rogers Comm., Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order,9 FCC Rcd. 7350, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 116 (D.A.
Acting Chief, Cable Services Bureau), involved cable television systems. In Re One Two
Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 924, para. 48 (1985),
approved a trust arrangement for the licensee of 15 full-service broadcast stations and seven
cable television relay service stations. Although figures are not available for the total number
of assignment and transfer applications granted in the cable and common carrier services
during the 1985-1994 period, the limited number of Commission decisions regarding hostile
tender offers in those services supports the conclusion that temporary authorizations in those
services are "extraordinary" events. There is no other evidence to support the critics' concern
that the Commission's expedited tender offer procedures would become widely used in a
variety of contexts to by-pass normal transfer procedures.
89. The Commission's Annual Reports provide only a total of all long- and short-form
applications. Short-form applications are used for involuntary transfers, such as from a
licensee to a trustee in bankruptcy, or for an insubstantial change in ownership or control,
such as transferring a license from a parent corporation to a wholly owned subsidiary. Such
applications are not relevant here. Long-form applications are used where there is a substantial change in ownership or control, which includes any tender offer for more than 50
percent of the licensee's stock. The 60-percent estimate is based on conversations with
knowledgeable members of the Commission's staff.
90. The Commission's figures are slightly lower than the general level of hostile tender
offer activity involving United States companies. In 1994, there were 109 tender offers
launched for United States corporations, of which 19 were contested. Answering the Call of
the SWifler Market: Intensifiing Competition andBigger DealsDrove a Recovery in the Use
of Tenders, MERGERS & AcQUIsITIONs MAG., May/June 1995, at 27. During the same year,
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These figures support the conclusion that hostile tender offer procedures
have not been abused and in fact are numerically extraordinary events.
Critics have expressed the concern that the offeror and the trustee will
not abide by their representations to the Commission regarding their
insulated relationship, and, therefore, that the offeror will prematurely
exercise de facto control of the stations. Yet the Commission's insulation
standards are not new and are available in a variety of cases; for example,
stations may be put in trust to avoid the application of the Commission's
rule limiting the number of stations that can be under common control in
a given area.91 Critics point to no case in which such a trustee has acted
inconsistently with the insulation criteria. The Commission's position is that
it expects applicants and its regulatees to abide by their representations and
that a petitioner's unsupported speculation that the parties have misrepresented their insulated relationship is not the basis for action.92 Misrepresentations to the Commission may potentially result in the loss of a license,93
a penalty that provides strong incentives to applicants to abide by their
representations.
Critics have also asserted that the expenditure of substantial funds by
the offeror in paying for the. tendered shares, if the offer is successful, will
prejudice the Commission so that it will reject any petitions questioning the
offeror's qualifications. These critics rely heavily on Community Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.94 In that case, the Commission had added a new television
channel to its television table of channel allotments95 and mutually
exclusive applications for the channel were on file. The Commission was
required in those circumstances to hold a comparative hearing among all
minimally qualified applicants to determine which of them would best serve
the public interest. The Commission granted interim operating authority to

there were 3993 mergers and acquisitions, as defined by the magazine. Id. at 48. Thus,
hostile tender offers represented less than 0.5 percent of the total mergers and acquisitions
during that year.
91. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1995). The use of trusts in other contexts is described in In
re Corporate Ownership Reporting and Disclosure by Brdcst. Licensees (Attribution of
Ownership Interests), Report and Order,97 F.C.C.2d 997, para. 53, 55 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 1465 (1984), reconsideredin part in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 604 (1985),furtherreconsideredin Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 FCC Rcd.
802, 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 739 (1986).
92. In Re News Int'l, PLC, Memorandum Opinion and Order,97 F.C.C.2d 349, para.
19, 55 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 945 (1984).
93. See FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946) (upholding a Commission decision
to deny license renewal to an applicant that had made several misrepresentations to the
agency).
94. Community, 274 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
95. 47 C.F.R. § 73.606 (1995).
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one of the competing applicants in order to provide service to the public
during the hearing. An applicant other than the interim operator appealed.
The concern was that the interim operator's expenditure of construction
funds and the experience gained in operating the station during the hearing
would weigh in the comparative consideration of the applicants. The court
agreed with the appellant and remanded for further proceedings, stating:
"Ordinary human experience tells us that these factors have a force which
cannot always be set aside by the triers no matter how sincere their effort
96
or intent.
Courts generally presume that administrative agencies act in an
unbiased manner consistent with their statutory mandates. The Community
Broadcasting Co. case is a narrow exception to that general rule, which
seems to have the greatest force when an agency is making subtle choices
among similar applicants for a valuable license. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, which issued the Community Broadcasting
Co. decision, has followed the general presumption in cases other than those
comparing applicants for vacant broadcast channels. For example, in Porter
County Chapter v. NRC,9 7 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had
approved the construction of a nuclear power plant. The appellants later
raised objections to the project, and the agency responded that it would
consider those objections upon completion of the plant, when it reviewed
the utility company's request for operating authority. The appellants claimed
that the expenditure of funds would prejudice fair consideration of its
contentions. The court responded:
We do not ignore appellees' fear that the inertia generated by completion of a nuclear plant, with the massive investment it represents, will
sway the licensing authority from faithfully carrying out its mandate to
protect the public safety, if necessary by denying an operating license.
While that contention may have practical force in some instances, a
court may not transform a projected tendency to inertia into a
presumption of infidelity to duty."
The speculation that an agency will act prejudicially is easy to make
and hard to prove or disprove. Giving credence to such speculation could
limit the substantial discretion granted to agencies in formulating their
procedures.9 9 Further, the circumstances before the Commission in

96. Community, 274 F.2d at 759. The court subsequently followed Community
BroadcastingCo. in similar circumstances in ConsolidatedNine, Inc. v. FCC,403 F.2d 585
(D.C. Cir. 1968).

97. PorterCounty, 606 F.2d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
98. Id. at 1370.
99. See, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville Brdest. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (stating that

"questions of procedure in ascertaining the public interest, when the Commission's licensing

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49

considering the qualifications of a hostile offeror fall much closer to Porter
County than to Community BroadcastingCo. First, the Act bars comparative
0 so there can be no
consideration of an applicant other than the offeror,"'
difficult or close comparisons to make among applicants as there was in
Community BroadcastingCo. Second, the court in Community Broadcasting
Co. was concerned that the experience gained by the interim operator or the
station might weigh in the comparative balance. In a hostile tender offer,
during the interim period while a potential petition concerning the offeror
is under review, the experience gained inures to the trustee, not the offeror.
Finally, as in Porter County, there will be a substantial investment by the
offeror to pay for the tendered shares. If the offeror is ultimately found
unqualified to hold a license, however, the trustee is obligated to find a
buyer that will pass Commission review, at the best price and terms
available, and then give the proceeds to the offeror. Thus, the offeror is not
at risk of losing its investment.10 Moreover, when the Commission rules
on a petition that raises questions as to the offeror's qualifications, it would
not know whether a potential, subsequent sale by the trustee would result
in a profit or loss to the offeror. It is therefore not apparent why the
expenditure of funds by the offeror in these circumstances would weigh in
the Commission's decision ruling on a petition. For these reasons, it is
unlikely that a court would reject the Commission's procedures based on
the speculation that it would not carry out its duties impartially.
As a matter of policy, the Commission will ordinarily entertain
petitions directed at the seller of a licensed facility, as well as the buyer. If
such a petition is filed and the seller is later found unqualified, the license
would be lost and therefore could not be transferred." 2 In the case of a
successful tender offer, however, the former shareholders are gone, and they
cannot be compelled to repurchase their shares. The critics take the position
that the derelictions of the licensee under its former owners cannot be raised

authority is invoked.. . were explicitly and by implication left to the Commission's own
devising, so long, of course, as it observes the basic requirements designed for the protection
of private as well as public interest').
100. Section 310(d) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1994), provides that when acting on

a transfer application, "the Commission may not consider whether the public interest ...
might be served by the transfer ...of the ...license to a person other than the proposed
transferee ......
101. The only risk taken by the offeror is that the market value of its investment may
fluctuate while the station is under the trustee's control. That is a risk shared by all
licensees, and that risk would apply to the offeror if it were in control of the station. Such
a risk is not legally cognizable prejudice.
102. For a more detailed description of this policy, see Sales of FCC Authorizations,
supra note *,at 338-52.

Number 1]

HOSTILE TENDER OFFERSFOR FCCLICENSEES

191

against the licensee under the control of the trustee. °3 They assert that the
loss of the ability of petitioners to question the qualifications of the licensee
under its former owners is another reason for rejecting the hostile tender
offer procedures.
This contention should be rejected. The policy of permitting petitions
against the seller was created by the Commission, which can modify or
even abolish that policy, provided it explains why it now believes that the
public interest would be better served by doing so. A modification of its
policy to accommodate the policies underlying securities laws and regulations seems well within the Commission's discretion." Further, the
critics' argument can be stated as follows: (1) when confronted with
"extraordinary" circumstances, the Commission can follow its normal
procedures under section 309(d) of the Act, or it can follow different
procedures under section 309(f); (2) the Commission should not elect to use
section 309(f), because to do so would deny petitioners of the procedures

specified in section 309(d). This is a tautology, not a reason for failing to
make use of the safety valve procedures permitted by section 309(f).
Further, petitioners retain the right to object, albeit not as formal parties, to
the qualifications of the licensee under the control of its shareholders before
the tender offer. The Commission will consider petitions to revoke
outstanding licenses, and has specified the same pleading standards as are
applied to formal petitions to deny. 5 Such petitions can be filed as to

103. This issue has not been clearly decided. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has strongly suggested the correctness of the critics' position in reference
to a trustee in bankruptcy. LaRose v. FCC, 494 F.2d 1145, 1146-47 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The Commission subsequently rejected that court's position, but without reference to it, in
the bankruptcy context. In Re Davis Brdest. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 67
F.C.C.2d 872, para. 7, 40 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1449 (1977). Whether the courts would
reach the same result in a context other than bankruptcy is not known. It should be noted,
however, that the Commission normally recognizes that the locus of control of a corporate
licensee is in its shareholders, Storer Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 763 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
which supports the position taken by the critics of the Commission's procedures.
104. This is not the first time the Commission has denied petitioners the opportunity to
challenge a seller's qualifications in a hearing. For example, if certain criteria are met, a
bankrupt licensee may be permitted to sell its station, even where a petitioner has raised
substantial and material questions of fact regarding the bankrupt seller's qualifications. In
Re Second Thursday Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order,22 F.C.C.2d 515, para. 5, 18
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 914 (1970). Permitting such a sale, in contrast to taking away the
license, increases the value of assets that can be distributed to innocent creditors. This policy
is based in substantial part on the Commission's desire to accommodate the policies underlying the bankruptcy laws.
105. Letter from Commission to Greater Portland Brdcst. Corp., 3 FCC Rcd. 1953, 1954,
64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1264, 1266 (1988).
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any licensee, including those up for sale or subjected to a tender offer.'0 6
D.

Effect of the SEC'S Subsequent Rule Change
As noted in note 6, when the Commission adopted Tender Offers in
1986, SEC regulations permitted tendering shareholders to change their
minds and withdraw their shares during the first fifteen days of the offer
and, if the shares had not then been purchased by the offeror, at any time
after sixty days. 107 In Tender Offers, the Commission noted that the use
of its normal procedures would not ordinarily permit action on a transfer
application before the expiration of the sixty-day period.'08 After the
Commission's action, the SEC changed its rules to permit withdrawal of
tendered shares at any time the offer remains open. 09
Agencies have very broad discretion when deciding whether to initiate
a rulemaking proceeding to modify its rules. That discretion is limited,
however, when a rule is based upon a specific premise that is no longer
valid. For example, in Geller v. FCC,"0 the Commission first announced
tentative rules regarding the regulation of cable television systems that
would affect copyright holders, television broadcast stations and networks,
and cable systems. The affected industries later reached a consensus that
proposed different rules, which the Commission adopted on the ground that
the industry-proposed changes would aid in the passage of much-needed
copyright legislation relating to cable television systems. Congress did in
fact later amend the copyright laws, which removed the Commission's
foundation for adoption of the consensus rules. The court required the
agency to review the relevant rules in those circumstances. That review, the
court stated, is required when "abnormal circumstances make that course

106. To date, no party has raised any questions as to the qualifications of a licensee that
was the target of a hostile tender offer.
107. 17 C.F.R § 240.14(d)-7(a)(1) (1985). Note that the statute upon which the rule is
based, 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(5) (1994), grants withdrawal rights during the first seven days of
the offer and after 60 days have elapsed, if the offer is still open. The same statute, however,
grants the SEC rulemaking authority to set different periods.
108. Tender Offers Policy Statement, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, par. 23-24.
Specifically, the Commission stated:
[r]he 60-day maximum represents a judgment by Congress that if the offeror has
not closed the transaction by that time it is not appropriate that he or she be able
to continue to lock up tendered shares. In our view, this indicates a Congressional
expectation that a tender offer would be conducted within this 60-day time period
under ordinary circumstances. Thus, we believe that agency procedures which
permit consummation of the tender offer prior to the expiration of the 60-day
period would properly accommodate the goal of government neutrality.
Id. para. 24.

109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(d)-7(a) (1996).

110. Geller, 610 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
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imperative."'
The court's standard would presumably apply to a policy statement
adopted after notice and comment, such as Tender Offers. The question is
whether the change in the SEC's regulation is an "abnormal circumstance"
compelling the Commission to revisit its tender offer policies. One side of
the argument is that the Commission's failure to act by the end of the sixtyday period does not trigger withdrawal rights for shareholders who have
tendered their shares. The decision to withdraw shares now remains with the
shareholders throughout the offer. On the other hand, the Commission can
be viewed as resting its decision on the general congressional view, as
expressed in the laws governing tender offers and review of proposed
transactions for antitrust compliance," 2 that unnecessary government delay
in reviewing tender offers is not neutral and aids incumbent management.
The relevant statute sets an outer, sixty-day limit within which Congress
expected most tender offers to be completed, and the SEC's action does not
affect Congress's expectation. The issue is unresolved, but the Commission
can still refer to the general congressional policy of expedition. The SEC's
changed rule should not constitute an "abnormal circumstance" requiring the
Commission to revisit its policy.
V.

A.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES UNDER THE POLICY STATEMENT

Applicability of the Tender Offer Policy to Corporations

Owning Cable Television Systems
In One Two Corporation,13 the case where the Commission
established its two-step expedited procedure, the target licensee held
licenses for both broadcast and cable television relay service stations. In
Tender Offers, the Commission stated that the policies set out there would
be applied to licensees in all services," 4 and the staff subsequently
applied the tender offer procedures to a company holding licenses only for
cable relay stations.' None of these decisions mentions or discusses the
applicability of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984116 (Cable

111. Id. at 979 (citation omitted).
112. Tender Offers Policy Statement, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, paras. 23-33.
113. In Re One Two Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
924 (1985).
114. Tender Offers Policy Statement, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, para. 45 & 1569
n.147 (1986).
115. In Re Rogers Comm., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7350,
75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 116 (1994) (D.A. Acting Chief, Cable Services Bureau).
116. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1994)).
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Act) to transfers involving cable systems. Among other things, that law sets
out separate areas of jurisdiction for the Commission and for local cable
franchising authorities. On matters that are relevant here, issuing and administering cable television franchises are matters generally left to local
authorities, while the Commission issues licenses for and approves transfers
of the cable relay stations.
The Cable Act states that "a cable operator may not provide cable
and defines "cable operator," ' to
service without a franchise ... ,
include a trustee for an offeror in a hostile tender offer. Most franchising
authorities require their prior approval before the transfer of control of a
system operator. When dealing with a multiple system operator, numerous
franchising authorities may be involved and obtaining any required advance
approval could take several months. There is nothing in the Cable Act to
suggest that transfers of franchises are subject to Commission regulation," 9 or that the Commission is free to impose a cable operator/trustee
on local authorities, without their approval. If a trustee were to assume
control of a cable system, he or she would be a cable operator providing
cable service in violation of the Cable Act. In circumstances where
obtaining approvals from local authorities are likely to take several months,
and where the trustee cannot legally take over operation, the need for
expedited action, which underlies the Commission's of use of section 309(f)
20
Accordingly, resort to normal
of the Act, is no longer relevant.
2
'
required.1
be
would
procedures
The Cable Act, in light of the above, arguably provides a basis for
delay, not available to other targets of hostile tender offers. That is an
unfortunate conclusion, from the perspective of the offeror, as it undermines
the general congressional goal of avoiding unnecessary government delay.
117. 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (1994).
118. 47 U.S.C. § 522(5)(B) (1994).
119. The legislative history supports the conclusion that transfers are under local control.
"[M]atters subject to state and local authority include, to the extent not addressed in the
legislation, certain terms and conditions related to ... the enforcement and administration
of a franchise (e.g., . . . transfers of ownership)." H.R. REP. No. 98-934, pt. 3, at 59,
reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4696.
120. Federal laws and regulations generally preempt conflicting state requirements. In
cable regulation, however, the allocation of federal and state responsibilities is set by federal
law; that is, the Cable Act. The Commission cannot preempt state regulations in areas that
are allocated to state authorities by federal law. 47 U.S.C. § 556 (1994).
121. In Re MMM Holdings, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,4 FCC Rcd. 6838,
66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1593 (D.A. Acting Chief, Mass Media Bureau and Deputy Chief,
Common Carrier Bureau), review denied in Memorandum Opinion and Order,4 FCC Rcd.
8242, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1706 (1989). The case is described and discussed above in
Part IV.B. As noted there, the case suggests that expedited procedures should not be used
where the offeror is in the same position if normal procedures are followed.
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The laws regarding tender offers antedate the 1984 Cable Act, and it might
be argued that the policies expressed in the earlier laws should not be
overruled without some specific intention of Congress.1" The rather
precise language of the Cable Act, however, appears to overcome that
contention.
Hostile Offers Turned Friendly: Which ProceduresApply?
The use of the two-step expedited procedures is generally limited to
hostile tender offers. In Rogers Communications, Inc., 123 the target and
offeror were large, publicly-traded Canadian corporations. Their major
assets were in Canada, but each owned, among other things, cable systems
located in the United States. The tender offer was initially hostile. After the
offeror filed the request for a temporary authorization and transfer
application, but before Commission action, the parties reached an agreement. The target conditionally supported the issuance of a temporary authorization to the offeror's trustee. There are agreements between Canada and
the United States regarding securities registrations, including those relating
to tender offers. 24 Further, Canadian law permits the use of a trustee to
hold tendered shares while the offeror's qualifications are reviewed by
Canadian authorities.12' In fact, the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission had approved a trustee before the staff
issued its decision in Rogers. That decision followed the two-step expedited
procedures, although the underlying rationale for those procedures is
generally absent in the context of a friendly tender offer. Arguably,
however, the complicating factors of Canadian ownership and laws would
be enough to find the transaction to be "extraordinary" within the meaning
of section 309(f). Rogers is, however, a staff decision, and the propriety of
the use of those procedures will not be definitively answered until, and if,
the issue is addressed by the full Commission.
The case nevertheless raises the question as to which procedures
should apply when a hostile offer turns friendly. If the change is made
before the Commission acts on the request for a temporary authorizaB.

122. See, e.g., Community Television of S. Cal. v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 509-11
(1983) (expressing reluctance to interpret a statute so as to modify previously enacted
legislation where there was no support for that result in the later statute or its legislative
history).
123. In Re Rogers Comm., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7350,
75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 116 (1994) (D.A. Acting Chief, Cable Services Bureau).
124. Id. at 7363 n.32, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 116, 123 n.32.
125. Id. at 7362 n.29, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 116, 123 n.29.
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tion, 26 and in the absence of complicating factors such as those in
Rogers, the target need only withdraw any objections or petitions it may
have filed. In most of the cases involving hostile tender offers, the only
party objecting to the transaction is the target. To date, in fact, the only
other parties who filed objections did not question the qualifications of any
of the applicants, only the use of the two-step expedited procedures. In
those circumstances, the Commission would be faced with an uncontested
long-form application. The Commission could then amend that application
to specify that the transferees are the target's shareholders, rather than the
trustee. This is the procedure used in MALM Holdings, Inc. 127 A petition
to deny was filed against the long-form application by a party other than the
target would be treated in the normal course, as contemplated by Tender
Offers.
VI.

OTHER APPROACHES TO HOSTILE TENDER OFFERS

While the Commission appears to have acted within the discretion
granted to it by statute, it might have exercised that discretion differently.
Two different procedures are discussed here.
A.

Purchase of Tendered Shares Without Voting Control Until
After Commission Approval
In 1968, Hughes Tool Company (Hughes) tried to acquire control of
American Broadcasting Companies (ABC) by hostile tender offer. In an
unpublished rling,12 the Commission tentatively concluded that a
hearing would be required regarding Hughes' qualifications. The letter also
suggests that it would be permissible for Hughes to buy the tendered shares,
but stated that Hughes was "specifically directed not to exercise any voting

126. The opportunity for a target to change its mind from hostile to friendly is of limited
duration. To date, the Commission has acted very promptly when dealing with hostile tender
offers. (On average, the Commission has acted in less than 37 days between the filing of the
request for a special authorization and the release of a decision granting or denying that
request.) After the special authorization is issued and the trustee acquires a majority of the
target's stock the trustee controls the company, and has the authority to block any action by
the company's management that is inconsistent with the successful completion of the tender
offer. The formality of changing the target's position from hostile to friendly at that point
would serve no purpose.
127. In Re MMM Holdings, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,4 FCC Rcd. 6838,
66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1593 (D.A. Acting Chief, Mass Media Bureau and Deputy Chief,
Common Carrier Bureau), review denied in Memorandum Opinion and Order,4 FCC Rcd.
8243, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1706 (1989).
128. Commission letter to counsel for Hughes, FCC 68-697, (July 3, 1968) (on file with
the FEDERAL COMMuNIcATIONs LAW JOURNAL). Under 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(2)(C)(i) (1994),

a ruling that is not published and indexed has limited precedential value.
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rights in the shares of ABC stock acquired or in any way to seek to
influence the policies or operation of ABC... ."The Commission reserved
the right to require divestiture of the acquired stock. Hughes, faced with a
potentially lengthy hearing, withdrew its tender offer.
The approach described by the Commission has two serious flaws.
First, the Hughes case provides no statutory support for by-passing normal
procedures and permitting the immediate purchase of the tendered stock
without voting rights. Normal thirty-day/petition-to-deny procedures are
required for transfer applications, except for applications that do not involve
a "substantial change in ownership or control." ' The language is in the
disjunctive. Accordingly, even where Hughes had no right to vote its stock
and lacked control, a change in ownership of more than half of the target's
stock must be considered substantial. The Commission, therefore, should
have specified that normal procedures would be applied to Hughes'
purchase of more than half of ABC's stock.3 0
Second, Hughes would have had to pay substantial amounts for the
stock, funds that would have been tied up for the duration of the hearing.
At the same time, the company would have remained in the hands of
management bent on defeating the offer. Management would have ample
time, for example, to sell the assets that made the company attractive to the
offeror, to incur debt and buy assets that are of no interest to the offeror,
and to restructure debt so as to use assets as collateral that might otherwise
be available for other purposes. Use of the purchase-without-control
procedure would seem designed to insulate incumbent management from a
hostile takeover.
B.

Expedited PleadingSchedules

Several parties suggested that the Commission simply follow normal
procedures, but adopt rules that would shorten the time for filing pleadings
in response to petitions to deny. Support for this proposal is based on the
following rationale. The thirty-day period for filing petitions is mandated
by section 309(d) of the Act.' 3 ' The periods for filing opposition and
reply pleadings are established by rule, as described previously,'32 and can

129. 47 U.S.C. § 309(c)(2)(B) (1994).
130. At that time, section 309(f) was still in terms of "emergencies," and temporary
authorizations could be issued for a maximum of 180 days. A hearing, hotly contested by
incumbent management, might well take more than 180 days, without consideration of
appeals from the hearing officer to the Commission or the courts. The statute did not take
on its current form until 1982. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
131. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1994).
132. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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be amended by the Commission. For example, in this age of facsimile
transmissions and overnight delivery services, permitting parties to serve
opposing parties by mail and granting an additional three days to file
responsive pleadings is certainly not required. By adopting such changes,
it would be possible to reduce the current period for filing a full set of
pleadings from the current fifty-one days to as few as forty days.133 The
decisions dealing with hostile tender offers have been lengthy, and often
deal with factually complex issues. Yet a review of the cases discloses that
the Commission has issued its decisions, on average, in less than thirteen
days after the filing of reply pleadings, with no case taking more than
seventeen days. 34 Accordingly, if the Commission were to shorten the
time for filing pleadings and to devote the resources to processing the
applications and related pleadings, it could act within the sixty-day period
it believed essential when it adopted its current policies in Tender Offers.
The tender offer could then proceed as scheduled in the typical case where
the offeror is found qualified.
There are, however, two significant drawbacks to this proposal. First,
it assumes that no hearing would be required. It is simply not realistic to
assume that the Commission could evaluate the pleadings and conduct a full
hearing within a sixty- or even 120-day period. The target would remain
under the control of the hostile management during this period, which has
serious drawbacks for the offeror. The most likely result, given the
difficulty in keeping capital commitments in place and keeping shareholders
from withdrawing their shares, would be withdrawal of the tender offer. In
these circumstances the procedures would be inconsistent with the concept
that government delay is not neutral in a contest between and offeror and
hostile management.
Second, the Commission noted a more significant problem that arises
even in cases where no hearing is required. Despite significant deregulatory
actions, the Commission must still consider a wide range of rules policies
and statutes in making public interest judgments under the Act. There
remain, for example, restrictions on alien ownership,135 policies regarding

133. This period contemplates filing a courtesy copy of the application with those
responsible for overseeing the acceptance of the application in Washington, in addition to
the copies submitted to the filing point in Pittsburgh; and preparation of the required public
notice manually, outside of the normal computer-generated notices. The 40-day period is
based on the following: two days to prepare and issue the required public notice, 30 days
for the required statutory waiting period, two days for the applicant to file an opposition, and
three days for the petitioner to file its reply.
134. These figures are based on the four cases that set out the filing dates of reply
pleadings.

135.

47 U.S.C. § 310(a)-(b) (1994).
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violations of law by applicants, 3 6 and limits on media ownership. 37
The Commission's review of a the qualifications of a trustee can be accom-

plished easily, because it is usually limited to one person, selected by the
offeror specifically to avoid any questions as to Commission requirements.
In contrast, reviewing the qualifications of a large, corporate applicant
is considerably more complex. The Commission's requirements apply to the
corporate applicant and to those who hold "attributable" interests in the
company; that is, officers, directors, and shareholders whose interests
exceed specified bench marks. Some persons may seek to insulate otherwise
attributable interests so as to avoid attribution. 3 8 In other cases, permanent or temporary waivers of particular requirements may be requested by
a transferor. In almost all major acquisitions by corporations, the staff
requests clarification or additional material, which can be voluminous and
which requires substantial time to analyze. This process often involves
statutory requirements, and the analysis should not be rushed. The
Commission was justified in rejecting an expedited pleading schedule on the
grounds that it "is critically important ... to evaluate the potentially

complex issues in a transfer application carefully," and that unreasonably
short deadlines would "impede [its] ability to perform this task with the
deliberation necessary to discharge [its] regulatory responsibilities."' 39 In
contrast, by using the two-step trustee procedures adopted for hostile tender
offers, the Commission can analyze offeror's qualifications at a reasonable
pace.
CONCLUSION

While one does not lightly disagree with such a distinguished jurist as
Judge Wald, the author believes that the procedures set out in Tender Offers
are consistent with section 309(f) of the Act and fall within the
136. In re Policy on Character Qualifications in Brdcst. Licensing, Report, Order and
Policy Statement, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179, 59 Pad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 801, reconsideredin part
in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 FCC Rcd. 421, 61 Pad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 619 (1986),
as modified by Policy Statement and Order, 5 FCC Red. 3252, 67 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1107 (1990), reconsiderationdenied in Memorandum Opinion and Order,6 FCC Rcd. 3448,
69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 278 (1991). Large corporations are often subject to a variety of
lawsuits concerning such matters as equal employment opportunity requirements and
compliance with antitrust laws. Not all convictions are disqualifying, but must be evaluated
under Commission standards.
137. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1995).
138. For example, an officer of a transferor may also be a limited partner in a
partnership that holds media interests that conflict with Commission requirements. The
Commission may request and review the partnership agreement to insure that the officer's
interest in the partnership is sufficiently insulated so as not to be considered attributable.
139. Tender Offers Policy Statement, 59 Pad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536, para. 32 (1986).
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Commission's wide discretion. The procedures adopted are not entirely
without their problems and there are issues that remain unresolved. Given
the recent upswing in merger and acquisition activity, and Congress' recent
action lessening restrictions on the ownership of media companies under the
Commission's jurisdiction,"4 the Commission may soon be called upon
to address those issues. Overall, however, those procedures serve to carry
out the Communications Act, while also accommodating the policies
underlying securities regulation and subjecting licensees to the discipline
imposed by potential tender offers.

140. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).

